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The foolish reject what they see and not what they think; the wise reject
what they think and not what they see. — Huang
Po

Divine Command Theory

The name “divine command theory” can be used to refer to any one of a family
of related ethical theories. What these theories have in common is that they
take God’s will to be the foundation of ethics. According to divine command
theory, things are morally good or bad, or morally obligatory, permissible, or
prohibited, solely because of God’s will or commands.

Divine command theory is often thought to be refuted by an argument known as
the Euthyphro
dilemma. This argument is named after Plato’s
Euthyphro, the dialogue in which it has its origin
(although contrary to popular belief the argument isn’t actually stated
there).

The Euthyphro dilemma begins by posing a question: Are morally good acts
willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because
they are willed by God? Whichever way the theist answers this question, problems
are thought to follow.

If the theist gives the first answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, holding that
morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, then he faces
the independence
problem; if morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally
good, then they must be morally good prior to and so independently of God’s
willing them. This is clearly inconsistent with divine command theory; the
divine command theorist must give the second answer to the Euthyphro
dilemma.

If the theist gives the second answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, holding that
morally good acts are morally good because they are willed by God, then he faces
the arbitrariness
problem, the emptiness
problem, and the problem
of abhorrent commands.

The arbitrariness
problem is the problem that divine command theory appears to base morality
on mere whims of God. If divine command theory is true, it seems, then God’s
commands can neither be informed nor sanctioned by morality. How, though, can
such morally arbitrary commands be the foundation of morality?

The emptiness
problem is that on the divine command analysis of moral goodness, statements
like “God is good” and “God’s commands are good” are rendered empty tautologies:
“God acts in accordance with his commands” and “God’s commands are in accordance
with his commands”.

The problem
of abhorrent commands is that divine command theory appears to entail that
if God were to command abhorrent acts—malicious deception, wanton cruelty,
etc.—those acts would become morally good.

Divine command theory is by no means the only ethical theory in the Christian
tradition, so the theist need not be overly concerned even if these objections
were thought to be successful. There are, however, theological reasons why the
theist might be attracted to divine command theory and so want to defend it. God
is claimed to be the creator of all things, and therefore the creator of our
moral obligations. God is claimed to be sovereign, to have the authority to tell
us how we are to live our lives.

There are also a number of biblical examples of God commanding acts that
would otherwise be thought to be morally wrong, acts such as plundering the
Egyptians [Exodus 11:2] or preparing to sacrifice one’s son [Genesis 22:2], thus
rendering them morally good. These considerations can most easily, though not
only, be accommodated within a divine command theory of ethics.

Copyright © 2008 Tim Holt. All Rights Reserved

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